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The iron and steel division is one of two mainly semimanufactured
product groups included in the study, the other being nonferrous metals
(Chapter 10). It thus covers items at an earlier stage of processing, and
includes a much higher proportion of standardized products than most
other groups. Some of the results and subjects discussed here reflect this
characteristic of iron and steel.
Germany was the leading exporter of iron and steel in 1963, followed
by Belgium-Luxembourg, France, and Japan. The United Kingdom and
the United States were the fifth- and sixth-ranking exporters (Table 9.1)
instead of being two of the first three, as was the case in most com-
modity divisions. More than two-thirds of EEC exports went to OECD
Europe (almost 50 per cent to other EEC countries); the proportion
was much smaller for the three main non-EEC exporters. In markets
outside Europe, on the other hand, the EEC countries were far less
important. Japan was the leader by a wide margin, and both the United
States and the United Kingdom sold more than Germany.
The bulk of exports—about 75percent—is accounted for by three
of the nine iron and steel groups. These are bars, rods, angles, shapes,
and sections (SITC 673); universals, plates, and sheets (SITC 674);
and tubes, pipes, and fittings (SITC 678).
An unusual aspect of this commodity division, as contrasted with
most machinery, was that a good deal of the competition for markets
involved the U.S. market. U.S. imports of iron and steel were consider-
Note: SITC 67. Value of OECD exports in 1963: $5.7 billions; 13 per cent of study
total. Coverage: Pig iron and ferro-alloys; ingots, bars, rods, plates, sheets, hoops, strips,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ably greater than exports, particularly in the first three groups and in
iron and steel wire. The main U.S. trade deficits were in bars, rods, etc.
(SITC 673), which contained two products, wire rod and reinforcing
bars, in which foreign inroads into the U.S. market were important.
Despite the amount of controversy engendered by steel imports the
ratios of the value of imports to U.S. new supply (output plus imports)
were still, at the end of our period, 5 per cent or less for all but one
of the five-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes included
in this division, the sole exception being steel wire, at 10 per cent. The
ratio for the main aggregate—blast furnace, steel mill, electrometallurgi-
cal products—was 4 per cent.1
These ratios are much lower than many quoted elsewhere, tor two
reasons. One is that the categories are fairly broad, and therefore do not
distinguish individual items such as wire rod and reinforcing bars, which
were meeting severe foreign competition. The second reason is that the
ratios are frequently given in terms of tonnage rather than value. The
imports are usually items that are less fabricated or of lower quality
than most of the domestic products in the same group, and the tonnage
data therefore tend to exaggerate the importance of imports. Some of
the tonnage ratios for specific products in this division in 1964 are
shown below: 2





Other bars and tool steel 7.2
Pipes and tubing 9.1
Drawn wire 13.5
Sheets and strip 3.4
While the tonnage data presumably exaggerate the impact of imports,
the value data probably understate it, because the prices are lower for
imports than for the competing American products.
1U.S.Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output, 1965 and 1964, U.s.
Bureau of the Census, 1967. Data are given in this publication for all the four- and
five-digit product codes of the Standard Industrial Classification that could be matched
with export and import trade categories.
2ForeignTrade Trends: Iron and Steel, 1967, American Iron and Steel Institute,
1967, p. 67.Iron and Steel 203
The severe competition encountered by U.S. producers in the U.S.
market had its counterpart in Europe. European producers suffered in-
roads by imports into their domestic markets, and the degree of com-
petition appeared to increase during the period covered by this study.
The OECD observed a change in the international market for iron and
steel during the early 1960s which it described as "...theincreasing
interpenetration of the industrialized countries' markets." To some
extent this may have been a response to low demand levels in home
markets even at low prices. However, the OECD report pointed out
that the trend continued even in 1964 when most member countries'
home markets were expanding.3 This increasing trade may, therefore,
represent a trend, rather than a cyclical phenomenon.
The outstanding change in export shares during the period of our
study (Table 9.2) was the decline of the U.S. share from 22 per cent
to 9 per cent between 1957 and the early 1960s. Although it recovered
somewhat after 1962 it did not rise above 10 per. cent. The main bene-
ficiaries of the U.S. decline were at first the Common Market countries,
whose share rose by over ten percentage points between 1957 and 1961.
but then receded to the earlier level. Within the EEC, Germany replaced
France as the main exporter. After 1961 the main development was the
growth of Japanese exports. The Japanese growth began before 1961,
although at a slower rate.
Nonprice Factors in Trade
Price competition, on which our measurement is focused, was only one
of the influences determining the flow of iron and steel trade. Some
large changes in trade were the result of strikes, government actions on
tariffs and other restrictions, and various other factors which our price
indexes do not encompass.
In the case of several strikes, for example, foreign sellers were able
to win-part of the domestic market of the country in which the strike
had taken place and also some of that country's usual export markets.
illustrations are provided by the strikes in the United States in 1959
and in the United Kingdom in
3Theiron and Steel Industry in 1964 and Trends in 1965, OECD, p.29.
4The British strike was said to have resulted in large imports of steel coil from the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CIron and Steel 205
Another influence on the flow of trade was the existence of capacity
limitations for specific products in some of the countries outside of the
United States. SOme types of steel plates and sheets (SITC 674) were
in short supply in the earlier years of our period, and exports of British
firms were held down by an informal limit on sheet exports until 1961.
Over part of the period British capacity was inadequate for the demand,
and there were, in addition, some quality advantages in foreign steel,
but both of these reasons for U.K. imports diminished in importance
by the end of the period.5 The issue of capacity arises in the case of
steel pipe (SITC 678) because demand for pipe sometimes comes in
large lumps, and few countries find it economical to have enough ca-
pacity on hand for these peak demands.
More broadly, however, the growth of capacity, protected by tariffs
and quotas, in countries that were formerly net importers slowed the
growth of trade in iron and steel. This was reflected in a reduction in
the proportion of iron and steel trade which the United Nations has
described as "deficit covering" from almost 80 per cent in 1950 to only
54 per cent in 1964.°
Aside from these commercial considerations, trade in iron and steel
has been influenced by a variety of governmental policies and inter-
ventions. For example, exports of pipes, tubes, etc. (SITC 678) have
been affected by political and military considerations. A Russian order
for large-diameter pipe was turned down by Germany in 1963 under
pressure from NATO, on the ground that they were strategic material.
The NATO restrictions were helpful to non-NATO countries in the
competition for such orders. In a number of instances, large amounts
inventory accumulation and brought into the market for foreign steel American firms
which had usually confined their buying to domestic sources. "United Kingdom: SCW
Buys U.S. Coil," MetalBulletin, January28, 1964; "Steel Strike in Britain Leads 2
Auto Makers to Order Foreign Steel," Wall Street Journal, January 2, 1964; "Scramble
for Steel: More Metal Users Turn to Warehouses, Imports to Build Strike Hedge," ibid.,
Febuary 5, 1965; The iron and Steel industry in Europe, 1958—1959, OEEC, 1960, pp.
81—83; "U.S. Steel Strike: A Long and Bitter Struggle Expected," Metal Bulletin, July
21, 1959.
5"AHollow Warning? The Complexities of Supply and Demand in Steel Sheets,"
Metal Bulletin, October 12, 1964; "Wanted—A Fourth Wide Strip Mill," ibid., March
8,1955; "Sir Julian Talks Horsesense," ibid., March 27,1962; Imported Manufac-
tures: An Inquiry into Competitiveness, U.K. National Economic Development Council,
London, 1965; "Steel Imports: Non-issues," Economist, August 13, 1966.
6World.Trade in Steel and Steel Demand in Developing Countries, United Nations,
Economic Commission for Europe, 1968, pp.13, 47—49,121—122. "Deficit-covering
trade" is equal to the net imports of those countries that are net importers and is
contrasted with "exchange trade," the rest of trade which represents mainly trade among
the iron and steel exporters.206 Product Reports
of steel pipe were sold in barter for other commodities, directly or under
general understandings about reciprocal orders. In some of these trades
political or balance-of-payments motivations were primary, and price,
or at least nominal price, was a secondary
Another governmental influence on the direction of the international
steel trade was the formation of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) under which a common market in steel began opera-
tions in 1953. Effects of the common market in the form of increased
price competition would be captured by our indexes, but the changes
in delivered prices that resulted from tariff reductions would be missing,
because we used only f.a.s. or f.o.b. prices. In addition, other aspects
of the common market, such as the reduction of nonprice barriers to
trade, would influence the flow of trade even if they were not reflected
in price changes.
At times the major steel producers have attempted through agree-
ments among the sellers to curb the price cutting which was eroding,
their domestic price structures. One report stated that "a gentlemen's
agreement between Germany and Japan prohibits the export of products
freely available in the respective home markets." Similar agreements
between the ECSC and U.K. mills were reported "...wherebyeach
side undertakes not to undercut the other's home prices..." onsteel
pipe. One of the most specific reports described a purported agreement
on small-diameter steel tubes in which European and Japanese firms
divided up the North American market, the former taking the area
roughly as far inland as Chicago and New Orleans and the latter taking
the western half of the country. The cartel was to regulate prices and
sales quotas.8
Part of the competition in the steel producers' own markets involved
purchases of foreign steel by nonintegrated processors, who used im-
ports to escape the price structure imposed by integrated producers.
The processors alleged that they were being squeezed by artificially low
margins between semimanufactured and finished product prices main-
tained by domestic integrated producers. An example of the conflict
7"IsraelOrders Steel from West Germans," New York Times, December 23, 1967;
"Austria Agreeable on Soviet Pipeline," ibid., March 3,1967; "Russian-Italian Talks
on National Gas Pipeline Reach 'Advanced Stage,'" Wall Street Journal, October 25,
1966; "Tubes: Reactions to NATO Pressure," Metal Bulletin, January 8, 1963; "NATO
Lifts Embargo on Oil Pipe to Reds," Wall Street Journal, November 11, 1966.
8"Japan-EuropeTube Cartel," Metal Bulletin, April19,1963; "ECSC-UK Rebar
Agreement?" ibid., July 5, 1963; "Steel Price Truce?" ibid., January 25, 1963; "A Ruthless
World Market," ibid., May 7, 1963; "The Japanese Scene: More Hot Coil Sales," ibid.,
May 22, 1964.Iron and Steel 207
between integrated and nonintegrated firms was the, claim that in times
of high demand the integrated British producers met their own needs
and forced rerollers to buy overseas at premium prices, and that in
times of slack demand the British mills kept up their prices of semi-
finished steel even when the market for finished products was weak.
The nonintegrated. producers were then forced to buy lower-priced
steel from abroad in order to survive. A number of other examples can
be found of claims by nonintegrated producers that the domestic price
spread discriminated against them and that only overseas purchases
permitted them to escape this discrimination. Independent wire manu-
facturers both in Britain and the United States purchased wire rod
abroad 'on these grounds. In the United States independent wire drawers
charged that the integrated producers kept the price of wire rod high
and stable between 1959 and 1963 (after raising it rapidly before then)
while the price of welded wire mesh was falling. The price differential
between domestic wire rod and finished products declined so far (even
to zero) they claimed, as to leave no room for profitable production
using American steel, and only the import of foreign wire rod, mainly
from continental Europe and Japan, permitted them to survive. An
attempt by the major integrated steel companies to bring action against
wire rod imports was rejected by the Tariff Commission in
Price Changes
The major price developments in iron and steel were the large increases
in U.S. and European prices between 1953 and 1957, the sharp de-
9"TheSteel Billet Controversy," Metal Bulletin, December 4, 1962; U.K. Iron and
Steel Board, Steel Imports, August 26, 1964; "Steel Imports and DUal Distribution:
The Plight of the Independent Wire Drawer and Fabricator," Congressional Record,
Appendix, April 28, 1965; "Imports of Steel Rods Necessary, Say Wire Producers at
Hearing," New York Times, May 8, 1963; "Steel Men Lose Case on Dumping," ibid.,
May 7,1963.See also U.S. Tariff Commission, Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods
from Belgium, T.C. Pub. 93, June 19, 1963; Hot-rolled CarbonSteel Wire Rods from
West Germany, T.C. Pub. 95, June 21, 1963; Hot-rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from
Luxembourg, T.C. PUb. 94, June 19, 1963; and Hot.rolled Carbon Steel Wire 'Rods from
France, T.C. Pub. 99, July 15, 1963.
For an analysis of competition on the U.S. market for wire rods and wire products
see Walter Adams and Joel B. Dirlam, "Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power,"
American Economic Review, September 1964. Lawrence B. Krause has suggested that
for several reasons, including fear of antitrust action, the integrated domestic firms in
the United States might not make use of this method of undermining the independent
nonintegrated producers. See Lawrence B. Krause, "Import Discipline: The Case of
the United States Steel Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, November 1962.208 Product Reports
Table 9.3
International Prices of Iron and Steel, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962 =100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964.
U.S. 84 101 102 100 99 100
U.K. 99 110 102 100 96 104
EEC 101 118 104 100 96 104
Germany 94 111 104 100 96 104
Japan NA NA 110 100 99 100
Source: Appendix C (extrapolated indexes).
dine in European, but not U.S., prices between 1957 and 1963, and in
Japanese prices (not available for earlier years) from 1961 to 1963,
and then the jump in European prices in 1964 while U.S. and Japanese
prices were almost stable (Table 9.3). In four of the five time intervals,
price movements were in the same direction in all the countries listed,
the exception being the period from 1957 through 1961, when Euro-
pean prices declined substantially from their Suez highs, while U.S.
prices rose slightly.
It has been suggested that some of the apparent upward trend in
U.S. domestic steel price indexes up to 1957 or 1958 and, presumably,
in some of our international prices as well, reflected only an upward
bias in them caused by the neglect of quality improvements: ".
thicknesstolerances have become much more stringent, although the
AISI [American Iron and Steel Institute] standards have not been
changed....Inmany other respects, such as strength, hardness, sur-
face characteristics and flatness, customers' requirements have become
more strict without any change resulting in charges for 'extras.'"10
Thedeclining price trends shown by our indexes during the early
1960s were related in the OECD annual reviews of the industry to the
entry of new producers and "...theresulting fierce and often cut-
throat competition," with mention being made specifically of rising
sales by Eastern bloc countries and "...strongJapanese price com-
petition on export markets...." U
10 HarlestonR. Wood, "The Measurement of Employment Cost and Prices in the
Steel Industry," Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1959.
11TheIron and Steel Industry, 1961, OECD, 1961, PP. 75, 79—80; The iron and
Steel Industry in 1962 and Trends in 1963, OECD, 1964, p. 74.Iron and Steel 209
Sharpening international competition led to an increase in ECSC
tarifis on most iron and steel products to the Italian level early in 1964,
and to a specific duty on pig iron imports, most of which came from
outside the ECSC.12
OECD reports for the first halfof1964 agreed with our indexes in
describing a strong recovery in most steel prices, although the dating
of our observations at midyear may have caused them to represent a
maximum for the year rather than an average.13
European and Japanese international prices appear in these indexes
to have been more flexible than U.S. prices after 1957, varying over a
much wider range with changes in economic circumstances. This pic-
ture is confirmed by a good deal of nonquantitative comment about
export price policies in the different countries.. The OEEC Iron and
Steel Committee suggested in 1960 that
•..thereis a fundamental difference in the export price policy pursued by
producers in the various exporting areas...;the producers in the E.C.S.C.
and Japan seem to adopt a much more flexible policy than others, such as
those in the United Kingdom and the United States•..;producers in the
E.C.S.C. and in Japan...seemto be prepared to try to expand their share
of the export market by making price sacrifices in order to keep their plant
in operation. This policy is in marked contrast to that followed in the United
States, and, it would seem, in the United Kingdom, where the steel industries
seem less disposed to offer heavy cuts in prices to overseas consumers.14
Our indexes do show smaller fluctuations in U.K. prices than in EEC
prices but the difference is not as great as this quotation suggests, and
the range of U.K. price movements after 1957 seems closer to that of
the EEC than of the United States.
It is conceivable that the apparent differences in price flexibility for
iron and steel as a group among the steel-exporting countries might not
reflect differences on an individual product level. Even if price fluctua-
tions for individual products were of equal size in Europe and the United
States, the European aggregate indexes might swing more widely if
European price movements for different products were closely syn-
chronized while those for the various American products were un-
synchronized and therefore offsetting. This possibility can be tested with
12 The Iron and Steel Industry in 1963 and Trends in 1964, OECD, 1964, p. 69, and
Steel Pricing Policies, London, PEP, December 1964, pp. 354—59.
13 The Iron and Steel Industry in 1964 and Trends in 1965, OECD, 1965, pp. 50—52.
14 The Iron and Steel Industry in Europe, 1958—59, OEEC, 1960, p. 97.210 Product Reports
data for the individual subgroups (four-digit SITC). Using the data
for 1961—64 (excluding 1953 and 1957 because the effect of the Suez
crisis was not of equal importance to each country), we find that the
frequency of very small price changes among the detailed subgroup
indexes was greatest in the United States and the frequency of large
price changes greatest in Japan (Table 9.4). The average and median
price changes also show the United States to have had the most stable
prices. The U.K. prices showed larger fluctuations, the German prices
still larger, and Japanese and other EEC countries the largest of all.
In other words, the greater flexibility of European and Japanese prices
does reflect the movement of individual series and is not simply an
aggregation phenomenon.
To some extent, the frequency of price changes represents trend
rather than cyclical movements. That seemsbe the case with Japan
in particular, since its prices were declining relative to those of the
other countries over the period as a whole. A confirmation of the Jap-
anese trend element is that its price changes were largest of all in
1962, a year of generally declining prices, but smallest of all in 1964,
a year of rising prices. There is a bias in the opposite direction, how-
ever, because we have no Japanese price data for SITC group 671,
which accounted for some of the largest price changes in other countries.
These data do not confirm the idea that price flexibility in the United
Table9.4
Distributionof Year-to-year Percentage Price Changes in Iron
and Steel Subgroups, 1961—64
Price Change
Per Centof Subgroup
U.S. U.K. Germany EEC Japan
15%and over 2 2 5 5 11
l0%but<15% 11 10 10 15 11
5%but<l0% 9 31 28 30 22
2%but<5% 28 24 28 17 33
<2% 50 33 29 33 22
Average %change 3.6 4.9 5.4 5.6 6.0
Median % change 2.0 4.1 4.2 5.0 4.5
Source: Appendix C.Iron and Steel 211
Kingdom was similar to that in the United States, as is suggested by
the earlier quotation from the OEEC. Although the fluctuations in U.K.
prices were somewhat smaller than those in Continental or Japanese
prices, they were closer to them in size than to the U.S. average.
A similar conclusion that the United States stood alone in the degree
of price inflexibility in iron and steel products was reached in a study
covering approximately the first half of our period. For four important
types of steel products it was found that "...U.S.export prices of
steel increased in both the 1954 and the 1958 recession, and decreased
in the 1954—57 expansion, relative to the export prices of steel of the
other major producing countries." 15Therewas also some indication that
Japanese prices fluctuated over a wider range than British prices.
Comparisons with Other International Price Data
Therelationship for all machinery and metals between our interna-
tional price indexes and indexes derived from wholesale price and unit
value data is discussed in Chapter 8. The iron and steel group, how-
ever, is particularly interesting in this respect because it consists of
comparatively standardized products, because there is considerable con-
temporary comment about price changes, and because there are pub-
lished export as well as domestic prices. Export price information on
iron and steel is published in leading trade journals, particularly the
Metal Bulletin, published in London, and the American Metal Market.
The former especially is widely cited in discussions of export price
movements. The most important alternative indexes are shown in
Table 9.5.
The coverage of U.K. export prices in these sources was too limited
for the computation of group indexes, but we were able to compute
fairly broad indexes for EEC iron and steel export prices (from the
Metal Bulletin) and for U.S. export prices (from the American Metal
Market). In Table 9.5 these indexes are called published export price
data. It should be stressed that the publications cited are not the authors
of the indexes but are sources for the specific price series which we
15HangSheng Cheng, "Relative Movements in the Prices of Exports of Manufactures:
United States Versus Other Industrial Countries, 1953—59," IMF Staff Papers, March
1962, p. 94.212 Product Reports
Table 9.5











U.S.: AmericanMetal Market 121101100101102124
EEC:MetalBulletin 118789395118 97
U.S.exportunit values 12610410199101133




Japan 123 98 92100100 112





Source: NBER prices: See notes to Appendix C.
American Metal Market: Prices for 35—65 items each year were taken from the issue
closest to July 1. They appear to be posted prices, and there is no indication that any
deviation of market prices from posted prices would be recorded. No prices are listed for
SITC 671, 672, and 679. Data for SITC 678 are given only at the end of the period.
Metal Bulletin: Prices for 10—20 products, collected from issues closest to July 1.
They purport torepresent actual market conditions rather than posted prices.
Unfortunately, very few items are listed, and only four of the three-digit SITC groups in
division 67 are covered at all. These groups do, however, account for two-thirds of the
value of trade in the division. The chief group omitted is tubes, pipes, fittings, etc. (SITC
678).Iron and Steel 213
Unit value data: See notes to Appendix G. About half of the commodities included
are semi-manufactures, and half are finished manufactures. The major gaps, from the
point of view of our OECD tiade weights, are ingots, bars, billets, slabs, etc. (SITC 672),
and wire rods (SITC 673.1).
Wholesale price data: See notes to Appendix F.
U.K. Iron and Steel Board: Prices, covering 30—40 products, are confined to the first
fivethree-digit groupsindivision 67 (see Table 9.1). These account for over
three-quarters of the trade in the division but exclude the more highly manufactured
products: wire, rail, pipe, and tubing. We combined the published prices into unweighted
indexes for four-digit SITC subgroups and aggregated these into three-digit groups and
the total index for iron and steel, using the OECD trade weights described earlier.
aThese price indexes are calculated directly from time-to-time data for all countries,
and therefore do not correspond precisely with those in Table 9.3.
bFor 1964/1957.
combined, using our international trade weights, for comparison with
the NBER international price indexes.
For the United States, the NBER international price indexes follow
those computed from published export prices very closely. The dis-
crepancies, although small, are all in one direction, and therefore cumu-
late through the period, with the NBER indexes declining slowly, but
consistently, with respect to the American Metal Market data. Over the
period as a whole, therefore, the difference is more substantial—about
six percentage points. The differences, which are slightly larger in 1961—
63 than in the other years, suggest that the published series may have
missed some of the shading of prices by American companies in those
years in reaction to European and Japanese competition. The apparent
bias in the published series was widespread throughout the various
groups of iron and steel products, and it is unlikely, therefore, that the
difference, small as it is, can be attributed to chance. A revealing fact
about the published U.S. prices is that reinforcing bars, subjected to
intense foreign competition, were dropped from the published indexes
after 1961, when published prices were withdrawn by U.S. companies.
Thus the international price index from published export prices does
not reflect the subsequent behavior of this price. We have some indica-
tion of the ensuing events from the BLS reports of a fall of 4 per cent
from 1961 to 1962. and a further 11 per cent from 1962 to 1963 in the
domestic price of reinforcing bars.16
16 Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, various issues.
The figures are averages of June and July. -214 Product Reports
The relation between NBER and Metal Bulletin prices for EEC ex-
ports was of a different nature. There was no consistent difference in
one direction, but the index from published prices showed more violent
fluctuations. It is possible that the index derived from Metal Bulletin
prices is more volatile than EEC export prices in general because of
the small number of commodities covered. These tended to be the ones
most important in trade and include several, such as wire rods and
concrete reinforcing bars, that were subject to particularly severe inter-
national competition. Products of alloy steels or those incorporating
other special features, not as standardized as the items in the Metal
Bulletin list, or those playing a less important role in international com-
petition, may have undergone less violent price fluctuations. The NBER
price collection, taken in large part from the purchase experience of
private companies, includes more of these items.
The third section of Table 9.5 gives an index derived from U.S.
export unit values, constructed, as far as possible, from data for the
commodities used by the U.S. Department of Commerce in its official
export value index (for which no separate iron and steel component
is published). No effort was made to pass judgment on the quality of
the individual unit value series used. Our main alteration in the unit
value data was the use of single-year OECD trade weights in place of
the Commerce Department's shifting U.S. export weights.
The largest difference between the unit value and NBER indexes is
in 1953—57, when the unit value index rose by six percentage points
more than the NBER one. The unit value index again outpaced the
international price index in the next two periods, but the differences
were smaller in the later years when price changes were smaller. Over
the whole time span we cover, however, the export unit value index
exaggerates the rise in U.S. prices by a considerable amount.
Comparisons of the unit value and NBER price indexes for the indi-
vidual SITC groups show wider differences and more frequent cases of
movements in opposite direction. The unit values for tubular goods
(SITC 678) exhibit particularly erratic behavior (see Appendix G).
Between 1957 and 1961, for example, they increased by 19 per cent
while the NBER index declined by 1 per cent, and the wholesale price
index showed virtually no change. This discrepancy cannot be explained
as a vagary of the unit value series for one or two commodities, since it
is based on fourteen relatives, of which twelve showed increases ofIron and Steel 215
more than 11 per cent. Apparently the tightness of supplies in Europe
following the Suez crisis led, in 1957, to the purchase from American
suppliers, especially for Venezuela and Canada, of large quantities of
cheaper types of pipe not ordinarily bought in the United States. By
1961 U.S. exports again consisted of the smaller, more specialized, and
therefore more expensive types of pipe. Because the system of pipe
classification in U.S. trade statistics omits some critical price factors,
such as diameter, the unit value index is vulnerable to this kind of error.
The unsatisfactory performance of unit value indexes in this category
casts them in a dubious light, since steel products present fewer prob-
lems for the construction of unit value indexes than most other kinds
of manufactured goods. Physical quantity data are given in the trade
statistics, and the degree of commodity detail is substantial: Over 100
separate commodity numbers are available in Schedule B (the U.S.
export trade commodity classification) for products in SITC 67. Fur-
thermore, steel products are comparatively homogeneous, certainly more
so than the machinery or transport equipment discussed in later chap-
ters. The size of discrepancies in this division, therefore, suggests that
the unit values from customs data are not useful for the construction
of price indexes over a wide range of products.
Comparisons with Domestic Prices
From 1953 to 1957 our index of U.S. domestic prices of iron and steel
based on BLS data rose substantially relative to international prices,
and there was a similar, but smaller, difference in the following three
periods. From 1963 to 1964, the two indexes showed the same price
movement. The U.S. index based on U.K. Iron and Steel Board data
showed a stronger and more persistent upward bias as a measure of
international price movements.
The differences between domestic and international price movements
were larger in the case of the United Kingdom. Domestic prices rose
by twice as much as international prices in 1953—57, and then, if we
judge by the wholesale price data, continued to rise in 1957—61 and
1962, when international prices fell. The Iron and Steel Board data
were a little closer to the international price index in 1957—61. How-
ever, both domestic series were stable in 1963 in the face of a further216 Product Reports
decline in international prices. In each of these cases we can say that
the domestic price index was biased upward, using the word "bias" to
describe any movement different from that of the international price
index. In 1964, however, the domestic price index, in both versions,
was stable in a year when international prices rose sharply. Overall, the
wholesale price index described a rise of 35 per cent from 1953 through
1964, and the international prices only an 8 per cent increase.
Except in 1953—57, the relationship was similar for Germany: an
upward bias in the index from domestic prices until 1963, and then
stability in domestic prices accompanying a large rise in international
prices. In the first period, however, domestic prices, presumably less
influenced by the Suez crisis, rose much less than international prices.
Since domestic prices are often used as proxies for international
prices, these differences in movement are important. They were noted
in published reports on the iron and steel industry as well.1T
The differences in movement between the indexes of home and export
prices reflect not only the behavior of the two types of prices but also
differences in the degree to which the reported prices correspond to
actual transactions prices. The 1958—59 report of the OEEC stated
that "...theexport prices used correspond in general to transactions
actually carried out, while the home price quotations, at least in the
E.C.S.C do not necessarily reflect the prices consumers actually
had to pay for their steel...." Thepoint was made specifically in the
report for 1962, one of the years in which the domestic price index
appeared to be biased upward. The OECD reported that list prices of
Luxembourg and German firms, except for those of one company, had
remained constant during the year and French list prices had risen at
a time when real prices were declining. Consequently, ". ..theeffect
that this sometimes unrestrained competition had on prices is not clearly
discernible from the published price lists." The same remarks were made
about both EEC and U.K. prices in 1963, and are in accordance with
the results in Table 9.5. Similarly, the OECD reported that the move-
ment of home market list prices in 1964 failed to reflect the improve-
ment in prices that occurred in the first half of that year. One reflection
17TheOEEC report for 19 55—56 stated that "...exportprices, being directly sub-
ject to the fluctuations and pressure of demand, rose more sharply than certain home
prices" (The Iron and Steel Industry in Europe, Iron and Steel Committee, OEEC, 1957,
p. 43). The 1958—59 report, in the same vein, stated that "... exportprices were again
more flexible than home prices from July 1958 to the end of 1959" (ibid., 1958—59,
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of the change was that the volume of ECSC sales aligned on offers from
third countries, which had increased in 1962 and 1963, when we found
home list prices to be biased upward, fell off by almost half in 1964,
a year in which we found home prices to be biased downward in com-
parison to international prices.'8
For the United States, these differences between international and
domestic prices of iron and steel apparently cannot be attributed to the
use of list rather than transactions prices in domestic indexes. Stigler
and Kindahi found that in this industry transactions prices moved very
closely with the BLS indexes.'9
The difference in trend between home and international price indexes
partly reflects a major change in the relationship between the absolute
levels of home and export prices which accompanied a shift from a
sellers' to a buyers' market. At the beginning of our period export prices
were higher than home prices, in some cases by substantial amounts,
particularly in the United Kingdom. That relationship, at least in the
United Kingdom, was still maintained in 1956. By the 1960s, how-
ever, the United States was complaining about dumping of some prod-
ucts by the United Kingdom, the EEC countries, and Japan, and these
charges implied export. salesat prices below those of home sales.
Similar price-cutting was reported in intra-European trade, one article
pointing out in 1963 that "...Britishmills, like those in the ECSC
and elsewhere, are. selling steel overseas at prices below national market
levels, have been doing it for years, and sometimes recently have quoted
virtually dumping prices."20
The shift in the relationship between export and domestic prices was
paralleled by a corresponding change in the relationship between actual
export prices charged by ECSC countries and the "Brussels Conven-
tion" official minimum prices. "...Inthe sellers' market from 1953
to 1958, effective export prices were significantly higher than the official
minimum prices. In the recession of 1958, on the other hand, effective
export prices fell well below the official minimum prices, despite severe
reductions in the latter." 21
18 Ibid., p. 96; ibid., 1962, p. 73; ibid., 1963, pp. 71—72; ibid., 1964, p. 49.
19 George J. Stigler and James K. Kindahi, The Behavior of Industrial Prices, New
York, NBER, 1970, Chap. 6.
20 "The Export Market: Re-Rolled Steel Prices Reduced," Metal Bulletin, July 24,
1953; "Steel Prices on the March," ibid., November 6,1956; "Imports: U.S. Gets
Tougher," ibid., January 1, 1963; "Limiting the Steel War," ibid., July 2, 1963; "Steel
Consumers in Revolt," ibid., July 20, 1963.
21 Hang Sheng Cheng, op. cit.218 Product Reports
Price Competitiveness
The price competitiveness of the United States in iron and steel rela-
tive to each of its main competitors declined sharply between 1953 and
1962 (Table 9.6). There was no change in 1963 relative to Japan, but
a continued decline relative to the EEC countries and the United
Kingdom. In 1964 the movement of the price relationships was reversed,
with the United States gaining on all the countries except Japan. Over
1961—64 U.S. price competitiveness de'clined relative to Japan but
gained slightly relative to the EEC and United Kingdom. But, over the
whole period after 1953 the United States lost heavily in comparison
to all the other countries. No Japanese index is shown for the years
before 1961 but the few fragments of data available for universals,
plates, and sheets (SITC 674) suggest a large improvement between
1953 and 1957 in Japanese price competitiveness relative to all the
listed countries.
Data for individual groups within iron and steel, given in Appendix
D, spell out much the same story of U.S. decline until 1962 or 1963
followed by a recovery in 1964. The main exceptions to the pattern
were tubes and pipes, in which 1961 was the low point in U.S. price
competitiveness, and some groups and subgroups in which the U.S.
position improved temporarily in 1957, as a consequence of the rapid
rise in EEC prices which resulted from the Suez crisis. But this brief
gain was quickly erased, and the period after 1957 showed a decline
Table 9.6
U.S. Price Competitiveness, Iron and Steel, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(1962=100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
Relative to
U.K. 117 108 101 100 97 104
EEC 119 117 102 100 98 104
Germany ill 109 102 100 97 104
Japan NA NA 108 100 100 100
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in U.S. price competitiveness throughout the range of iron and steel
products.
The published export and domestic price data discussed earlier imply
alternative indexes of U.S. international price competitiveness, which
are compared with the NBER indexes in Table 9.7. The differences are
sometimes large, but vary from one index to another. The indexrelative
to the EEC countries that is based on published export prices magnifies
the fluctuations shown in the NBER index. The declines are larger in
each period between 1957 and 1963, and the rise is much larger in
1964. The former index shows not only larger fluctuations than the
latter, but also a greater deterioration in U.S. price competitiveness over
the whole span of years: 22 per cent instead of the NBER estimate of
Table 9.7
U.S. Price Competitiveness in Iron and Steel: Indexes Based on











United Kingdom 93 93 99 97 107 89
EEC 98 88 98 98 107 88
Germany 98 93 98 97 107 93
Japan NA NA 92 100 100 NA
Published export prices
EEC 98 77 94 95 116 78
Official data on domestic wholesale prices
United Kingdom 100 100 103 100 100 103
Germany 83 107 101 100 98 87
Japan 96 96 92 100 99 85
U.K. Iron and Steel Board dataon domestic prices
United Kingdom NA 94 104 99 99 96a
Germany NA 102 99 99 98 98a
France NA 85 105 99 98 87a
Source: Table
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12 per cent after 1953, and 20 per cent instead of 10 per cent after
1957.
The indexes from published export price series, although they seemed
to exaggerate movements in price competitiveness, generally changed
in the same direction as the NBER series. The indexes derived from
domestic price data, on the other hand, frequently moved oppositely to
the NBER indexes or were stable in the face of large changes in the
price competitiveness measures based on international prices. The whole-
sale price data showed a slight gain in U.S. price competitiveness rela-
tive to the United Kingdom over the whole period while the inter-
national price data showed a substantial loss. Relative to Gennany, the
wholesale price data index moved opposite to the international price
data index in 1957—61, 1962, and 1964. These comparisons clearly
show that domestic prices frequently give highly misleading indications
of the extent and direction of changes in international price competi-
tiveness in iron and steel.
Comparisons between changes in price competitiveness and in export
shares are hindered by the effect of the Suez crisis in 1957. If we com-
pare 1953 to 1961, ignoring 1957, the indexes show large declines in
U.S. price competitiveness relative to both the U.K. and EEC countries,
with the decline relative to Germany not as large as that relative to
other European countries (Table 9.6). The U.S. decline is reflected in
a sharp cut in the U.S. share of exports—from 20 to less than 10 per
'cent (Table 9.2). The German price record, apparently less impressive
than that of the United Kingdom or other European countries, was
associated with an excellent export performance—almost doubling Ger-
many's share of OECD steel exports.
From 1961 through 1963 the main development in price competitive-
ness was the improvement in Japan's position, and this gain was matched
by a major gain in export share. The continuing deterioration in U.S.
price competitiveness relative to the United Kingdom and the EEC
countries did not have any apparent effect on export shares.
In 1964, both Japan and the United States improved their price com-
petitiveness relative to the United Kingdom and the EEC countries, and
both Japan and the United States increased their export shares at the
expense of the United Kingdom and the EEC countries. The deteriora-
tion in price competitiveness was slightly larger for Germany than forIron and Steel 221
the other EEC members, and it was Germany that accounted for the
fall in the EEC's export share.22
We have discussed the effects of changes in price competitiveness in
terms of the share of export markets. In several items of this group,
however, much of the competition has been on the U.S. domestic mar-
ket between imports from abroad, which appear in our export .ata,
and U.S. domestic sales, which do not. The extent to which exports by
Japan and the European countries replace U.S. domestic rather than
export sales is not revealed in our tables here. However, it has been the
focus of much of the recent discussion of the declining competitiveness
of the American steel industry, and our indexes should relate to this
competition as well as to that on foreign markets.
Adams and Dirlam, in a study concentrating on wire rod and wire
prices, found a large decline in U.S. price competitiveness in wire rods
on the U.S. market between 1958 and 1962.23
This fits the pattern of our price data although we do not find U.S.
prices quite as stable as the published domestic prices they use. The con-
sequence of the decline in U.S. price competitiveness was a rise in the
ratio of imports to U.S. production of wire rods from 1 per cent in 1957
to almost 15 per cent in 1962, and a rise in the ratio of imports to non-
captive production from 5 per cent to 39 per cent in the same period.24
Price Levels
Despite the considerable improvement in the U.S. price position in iron
and steel in 1964, price level differences between the United States and
the competing European and Japanese producers at the end of our
period were larger than for any other commodity division for which we
22 Hang Sheng Cheng (ibid.), examining changes in exports over shorter periods than
ours .forthe early years, concluded that "...asignificant part of these changes in
the U.S. share can be attributed to changes in U.S. export prices of steel to
those of other exporting countries...." Hefound that relative U.S. prices increased
in the 1954 and 1958 recessions and decreased in the 1954—57 expansiOn, and that the
U.S. export share fell during the recessions and rose between 1954 and 1957.
23 Walter Adams and Joel B. Dirlam, "Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power,"
American Economic Review, September 1964, p. 636.
24 Ibid.,p.631. Adams and Dirlam have suggested that since independent Wire
fabricators continued, for reasons of safety among others, to purchase part of their
requirements at the high domestic price, the integrated companies found it more profit-
able to keep the price structure at the cost of losing part of their market than to risk
a widening of price competition among domestic firms (ibid., pp. 638 if.).222 Product Reports
Table 9.8
Price Levels, Iron and Steel, 1953, 1957, 1961—64
(U.S. for each year =100)
1953 1957 1961 1962 1963 1964
U.s. 100 100 100 100 100 100
U.K. 92 85 .79 78 76 82
EEC 88 87 76 74 72 78
Germany 85 83 77 76 73 78
Japan NA NA 75 70 70 70
Source: Appendix E.
had data. The United Kingdom was the highest priced of the com-
petitors listed, followed by the EEC countries, at 22 per cent below
the U.S. level, and Japan at 30 per cent lower (Table 9.8). The
gap was largest in 1963, when the European countries' prices were
approximately 25 per cent below the U.S. level. The EEC price level
was below that of the United Kingdom in every one of the years except
1957, when the Suez crisis led to larger fluctuations in EEC than in
U.K. prices. Japan's positions as the lowest-priced exporter was clear
by .1962,but it may have been reached earlier. However, Japanese
export prices were probably fairly high at the beginning of the period.
The data in Hang Sheng Cheng's article, referred to earlier, imply large
gains between 1953 and 1959 in Japanese price competitiveness relative
to the United. States in bars, plates, sheets, and structural steel, and
relative to the United Kingdom and the ECSC countries in all except
Since the Japanese levels were similar to those of the United
Kingdom and the ECSC countries in 1961, these gains in price competi-
tiveness suggest that the Japanese prices were probably above European
levels before 1961.
The large price level differences ran consistently through the indi-
vidual groups of iron and steel products. All the EEC price levels for
three-digit SITC groups were 20 per cent or more below the U.S. level
in 1962 and 1963 (see Appendix E). Japanese price levels were gen-
erally lowest of all in the later years; they were below those .of the
European countries in 1964 in all four of the groups for which we
could calculate them.
25HangSheng Cheng, op.cit., p. 92.Iron and Steel 223
Summary
U.S. prices of iron and steel products increased relative to those of the
European countries and Japan before 1963 but held even with Japan
and gained on the other countries in 1964. The main price changes
seem to have been at least roughly reflected in shifts in trade shares:
large losses for the United States and large gains for Japan.
Published export price data appear to distort the size, but not the
direction, of changes in price competitiveness, while domestic prices are
often misleading even as to direction. The U.S. unit value data appear
to exaggerate the rise in U.S. export prices seriously and also to incor-
porate changes in average values which clearly do not represent price
changes even in some of the more narrowly defined commodity groups.
The U.S. price level for iron and steel relative to that of other coun-
tries was higher than that of any other commodity division in 1964.
Japan was the lowest-priced seller, but even the European countries
were undercutting U.S. prices by about 20 per cent.